A quick summary of Moral Uncertainty
We are sometimes uncertain about empirical facts, such as whether it will rain tomorrow. But we can also be uncertain about moral facts, such as whether it's wrong to steal, or how we should value the well-being of animals. Uncertainty about whether it's wrong to steal is uncertainty about moral or normative facts, while uncertainty about how we should value the well-being of animals is uncertainty about axiological or value facts.
Can moral uncertainty be rational, and what should we do in response to it? We might think that it can never be rational to be uncertain about normative or axiological facts, because such facts are, like mathematical facts, knowable a priori. Nevertheless it seems that agents like ourselves are uncertain about non-trivial mathematical facts, and that we are also uncertain about normative and axiological facts. Given this, it seems necessary to develop some account of how we ought to act under moral uncertainty.
- Nick Bostrom: Parliamentary Model
- Open Philantropy Project: Worldview Diversification
- Will MacAskill: Expected Moral Value (for cardinal moral theories)
- Will MacAskill: Borda Rule (for merely ordinal moral theories)
- Christian Tarsney: Stochastic Dominance (for merely ordinal moral theories)
- My Favourite Theory (generally considered inadequate)